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As
We See It ...
Fourth
Quarter 2007
Happy New Year, we
think. Regardless of whether or not we are actually in or entering a recession,
the stock market is making it feel like one. After a soft fourth quarter in
which some of our successful technology holdings pulled back sharply and MBIA
had a precipitous decline, the S&P 500 has corrected another 10% in 2008 as
of this writing.
Even though banks,
mortgage companies, and investment firms holding mortgage backed securities or
their derivatives are bearing the brunt of the "correction", the
contagion is remarkable. Consumers have trouble making their mortgage payments,
so they cut back on discretionary items, including high definition TVs. This has
hurt companies such as Comcast, whose revenue growth is driven by selling new
services like HDTV to existing customers. The electronics companies order fewer
semi-conductor chips from Maxim Integrated Products, for example, because they
are building fewer TVs. The semi-conductor companies find themselves with excess
capacity, so they cancel or postpone their orders with ASM Lithography or
KLA-Tencor. KLA-Tencor defers the headsets it ordered from Plantronics, as their
executives look at the business outlook and decide to tighten their belts. And
so on…
Capitalist
societies go through cycles like this on a regular basis. While in the past
these cycles took years to unfold, we have such a global, information intensive
society and economy that the cascade of events we described above occurred in
about four months since the "subprime" bubble burst in August.
Businesses react much faster to new information. So does the stock market.
What should we do in this
situation? 1) Not panic. We are confident that our investment process has helped
us identify strong companies with sustainable competitive advantages. They have
healthy balance sheets and can weather the vagaries of the business cycle. Over
a five to ten year horizon we are confident they will out-perform the market. If
new evidence emerges that a company’s competitive advantages are not what we
thought, then we sell the stock. For example, we exited our MBIA positions the
instant we doubted that they would be able to maintain their "Triple
A" credit rating, the cornerstone of their competitive advantage. We
realized losses for most accounts, but ended up avoiding another 50% drop in the
price. 2) Look for opportunities. Over-reactions are common in these
environments. We may get a chance to buy strong, growing franchises at bargain
prices.
The Economy...
Fear. That is the
outcome of the sub-prime housing problems: fear and $100 billion in losses. $100
billion is a huge number and difficult for most people to even contemplate. The
newspapers have had a field day with the whole issue . People being evicted from
their homes have provided fabulous fodder for the print and TV journalists. The
outcome of weakness in the housing sector, as they reported it, could only be
RECESSION. And the worst is yet to come: resets on home mortgages sold by the
sub-prime vendors were due to arrive in 2008, plunging an additional (and much
larger) group into trouble as their interest rates rose to levels that the home
owners could not sustain, and as a consequence, many more housing defaults.
Maybe. It was
pointed out to me that LIBOR has declined to 3.125% and Treasury bills were very
low as well, and therefore how big was the expected reset. Gosh, some of these
resets might be LIBOR + 3%, or a mortgage rate in the low 6% range. This is
about the level one might expect for an individual with excellent credit on a
30-year mortgage. It is entirely possible that the Federal Reserve’s cuts in
rates will result in a reset that is not too different from the current mortgage
rates that the sub-primes are carrying. In other words, the reset could have
little or no impact on mortgage default rates. Perhaps this reset event will not
have the terrible impact that was anticipated. More to the point, the problems
start well before the reset date, as a large percentage of the mortgages in
trouble are in trouble almost immediately, with missed or late payments. There
are home owners with "teaser rates" that are about to be in trouble
with their new payment. The difficulty does not stem from an unreasonable
payment, but that these homeowners could not ever sustain anything that looked
like a normal payment – they could only sustain the "teaser" rate.
Special Investment
Vehicles were a potential disaster area and represented billions of short-term
assets and the pools of investments included some sub-prime-based Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDOs). Many banks started these vehicles as a way of carrying
the pools off their balance sheets, and therefore, not having to provide
reserves for them. Needless to say, these vehicles had a hard time rolling over
their short-term commercial paper when investors learned that some of the
underlying investments were questionable. A couple of SIVs went bust, and the
commercial paper market dried up, and there was a real crisis in the banking
system, a liquidity crisis. Banks began to worry about their counter-parties in
the banking business and became reluctant to lend to them, causing a real
crisis. The actions of the Federal Reserve and the European Central Bankers have
overcome that problem. The banks have absorbed the SIVs back onto their balance
sheets, to a large degree, solving that problem.

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